Today, stories of the Punic Wars are often mentioned as a stepping stone that led Rome from a small city-state to the master of the entire Mediterranean region. However, this perspective often overshadows the viewpoint from Carthage, reducing them to just a secondary opponent of Rome. To truly understand the First Punic War – its causes, how it was conducted, and its outcome – we must place it in the geopolitical context of the time and consider the motivations of these two distinct cultures.
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Carthage’s experience on the island of Sicily was shaped by seven wars with the Greeks in Sicily. However, what is less often mentioned is the reason they continuously sent multinational mercenary armies through massive fleets to Sicily. The short answer is: maritime routes.
After their mother colony, Tyre, was conquered by the Babylonians, Carthage inherited a vast trade network stretching across the Mediterranean from southern Iberia in the west to the Levant in the east. Viewing the entire Mediterranean as a complex trading system in the 6th century BC, we can easily understand why Carthage dominated the central Mediterranean region.
To ensure the security of these routes, Carthage needed to control both flows of traffic. As a result, the western tip of Sicily became extremely important. Small Phoenician colonies had been established in this area for many centuries, and as Carthage grew, these colonies quickly fell within their sphere of influence.
Many efforts by Greek settlers (including events such as Doreius and Pentathlos) to settle in the western third of Sicily faced swift and decisive responses from Carthage. Their involvement in conflicts with the Greeks in Sicily largely stemmed from their suspicions of alliances between the Greeks in Sicily and the ambitions of the unpredictable tyrants in Syracuse.
They closely monitored the geopolitical situation in eastern Sicily and frequently intervened to protect smaller city-states in order to limit Syracuse’s power. Carthage often quickly mobilized forces but was also willing to turn initial aggressiveness into a favorable peace treaty. They preferred intimidation tactics over outright warfare.
The Carthaginians were not interested in territorial expansion. Expanding their territory meant greater military commitments, but it also brought the stability they sought. In contrast, as we will see, the Romans had an entirely different approach.

The Cause of the War (Casus Belli)
According to the historian Polybius, many treaties had been signed between Carthage and Rome in the preceding centuries, clearly delineating each side’s sphere of influence. Despite this, trade between the two powers was still active, and relations were generally amicable. However, everything changed in 264 BC.
A group of mercenaries, the Mamertines, who had served Syracuse, betrayed their former masters and seized the cities of Messana and Rhegium. Rhegium was located at the southern tip of the Italian Peninsula, while Messana was on the opposite side of the sea in Sicily. These two cities, situated along important sea routes, were now in the hands of unpredictable mercenaries. Rome besieged Rhegium, while Syracuse crushed the Mamertine forces in a battle.
The desperate situation of the Mamertines led to an almost comical factional development, as they called for support from both Rome and Carthage. The Carthaginians were the first to respond. Attracted by the strategic location of the Strait of Messina and viewing the Mamertines as a common enemy with Syracuse, Carthage agreed to provide assistance.
In contrast, Rome was torn on how to respond. The consul of the year, Appius Claudius Caudex, called for direct intervention, hoping to gain fame as the first to lead Roman forces beyond the Italian peninsula. This revealed a contradiction: Rome was willing to defeat the Mamertines at Rhegium but also sought to help them at Messana. Polybius did not overlook this hypocrisy in his records.
Rome was well aware that if they responded to the Mamertines’ call, a conflict with Carthage was inevitable. Just as Carthage did not want a powerful Syracuse, Rome, according to Polybius, was also concerned about the prospect of Carthage—already controlling territories in Africa, Iberia, Sardinia, and Corsica—dominating all of Sicily. The unavoidable war had begun to take shape.
The Battle of Agrigentum
The early years of the war, beginning in 264 BC, were marked by few major battles. In fact, throughout the decades-long war, large-scale battles in Sicily were rare. The Battle of Agrigentum (Akragas) was an exception.
At this point, Rome did not have a fleet large or powerful enough to compete with Carthage, so they deployed two armies led by consuls (around 40,000 soldiers) to Sicily to clash with the Carthaginian garrison at Agrigentum. Hannibal, the son of Gisgo (not Hannibal Barca), gathered forces from the surrounding areas and attacked the Roman troops as they were gathering supplies. Despite being surprised and scattered, the Romans were able to repel the attack and prepare for a siege.
Hannibal quickly sent an urgent message to Carthage, and since the Romans were unable to blockade the port, a relief force was dispatched to Sicily. The besiegers quickly became the besieged. Both sides were under pressure to face off directly as the food supply ran out for both the Carthaginian inhabitants of Agrigentum and the besieging Roman forces.
Rome deployed their characteristic formation, triplex acies (three lines of troops), and engaged the Carthaginian frontline, supported by war elephants. It is possible that the Romans, due to their experience fighting Pyrrhus, were more familiar with dealing with war elephants than the Carthaginians were in their use of them.
The Carthaginian formation quickly broke, and the advantage of war elephants and Numidian cavalry was neutralized by the strong Roman infantry attack. The Punic camp was captured, and soon after, the Romans entered Agrigentum without resistance.
True to Carthage’s tradition, they adopted a conciliatory approach in the first two years of the war, hoping that their immense wealth and resources would deter Rome from fully engaging in combat. The Battle of Agrigentum marked the first large-scale confrontation between the two powers and ensured the escalation of the conflict.

The Battle of Cape Ecnomus
The land war in Sicily reached a stalemate. The rugged terrain and mountains slowed the progress of the war. Like the Spartans had realized in the Peloponnesian War, the Romans, according to Polybius, realized that there could be no decisive victory without a powerful fleet.
The Romans seized a wrecked Carthaginian ship and began copying the technology. Soon, they had built and commissioned 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes. With this fleet, Rome sought to end the war by attacking Carthage’s territory in Africa.
In 256 BC, the Roman fleet, consisting of 350 warships and transport ships, commanded by both consuls, anchored off the settlement of Ecnomus. Each ship carried 300 rowers and 120 marines. To counter the threat from the Roman invasion, Carthage mobilized a fleet with 150,000 soldiers.
Relying on the superior speed of their ships, the Carthaginian fleet was arranged in a long, linear formation. Meanwhile, the Roman formation was much more compact: three lines with transport ships in the center and the triarii as reserves at the back.
The Carthaginian ships quickly gained the upper hand, surrounding the Romans and attacking the center of their formation with the intention of splitting off the Roman front lines. The battle split into three “fronts.”
What Carthage underestimated was Rome’s ability to turn a naval battle into a land-based battle. The Roman corvus (the spiked bridge) was lowered onto Carthaginian ships, transforming them into a battlefield. Under this pressure, the Carthaginian center was broken. Once the formation was pierced, the Roman ships returned to attack the flanks. The battle ended with the collapse of the Carthaginian fleet, clearing the way for Rome to advance into Africa.

The Invasion of Africa
After the victory at Ecnomus, the consuls Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vulso continued their advance into Africa, landing at the Cape Bon peninsula and besieging the town of Aspis. The town quickly fell, with 20,000 prisoners taken.
Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander, along with Hanno and Bostar, who had been recalled from Sicily, followed Regulus’s forces. Like at Agrigentum, they built a fort opposite the Roman forces. However, Polybius heavily criticized Carthage’s decision.
The high ground made it impossible for them to fully exploit their numerical or mobility advantages. Recognizing this mistake, Regulus immediately launched an attack on the Carthaginian position. The Carthaginian army, hastily assembled under three different commanders, could not effectively resist the dawn attack.
Buoyed by this victory, Regulus captured Tunis and directly threatened the walls of Carthage. After suffering another defeat in Africa, Carthage offered peace. However, the harsh peace terms presented by Regulus forced Carthage to make a more drastic decision.
With the arrival of Spartan mercenaries in the spring of 255 BC, Carthage was able to form a new army. Under the command of the Spartan general Xanthippus, this army faced the Romans at the Bagradas River. By making full use of cavalry and war elephants on the open terrain, the Carthaginians overwhelmed and completely destroyed the Roman forces. The Roman consular army was wiped out, and Regulus was captured. Carthage regained its chance to continue the prolonged conflict.

The Battle of the Aegates Islands
Although Carthage achieved a significant victory over Regulus and removed the immediate threat, the war would continue for another 14 years.
During this period, the command of the Carthaginian infantry was given to Hamilcar Barca. With his excellent leadership, Hamilcar led the land campaign to a stalemate with the Roman forces. However, he faced many difficulties due to a lack of supplies. The prolonged deadlock in Sicily and recent successes at sea made the Romans confident that the war would be decided on the water. Hamilcar was stuck, and there was nothing he could do but watch the decisive battle unfold just off the coast of Sicily.
Due to a shortage of manpower and finances to build a new fleet, Carthage assembled 250 warships with the primary goal of resupplying Hamilcar, and then recruiting more infantry from his army to serve as marines.
Under the influence of strong winds, Roman consul Gaius Catulus moved to intercept the Carthaginian fleet before it could join Hamilcar. With their sails up and loaded with supplies, the Carthaginian fleet was unprepared for combat. The Roman fleet, consisting of 200-300 warships, charged, pierced through, closed in, and overwhelmed the Carthaginian formation. More than half of the Carthaginian ships were sunk.
This was a devastating defeat. Not only did it end Hamilcar’s prospects of continuing his fight on land, but it also shattered Carthage’s naval defense capabilities. After over two decades of war, Carthage’s government was financially exhausted. Unable to prolong the conflict, Carthage had no choice but to order Hamilcar to begin negotiating a peace treaty.

A “Carthaginian” Peace
Carthage ordered Hamilcar to initiate peace negotiations. Angered by the idea of surrender and wanting to avoid being held accountable or judged by the Court of 104, Hamilcar quickly distanced himself from this process.
Rome, after many years of war, was also nearly bankrupt. To finance the construction of a new fleet and sustain the war, they had to borrow money from private citizens after the Battle of Drepana, and these loans needed to be repaid. However, the advantage was entirely with Rome.
According to the historian Polybius, the terms of the Treaty of Lutatius forced Carthage to withdraw from Sicily, agree not to wage war against Hiero or the Syracusans, release all Roman prisoners without ransom, and pay a war indemnity of 2,200 Euboic talents of silver.
For Rome, which typically sought to completely conquer its defeated enemies, this treaty was an acknowledgment of Carthage’s strength, while also highlighting their financial exhaustion. Although it was not as harsh as the terms after the Second and Third Punic Wars, the treaty solidified Rome’s control over Sicily—an area that Carthage had spent countless resources and lives defending for nearly five centuries.
For Carthage, particularly for Hamilcar, the treaty was a humiliation and a practical acknowledgment that they no longer dominated the central Mediterranean or profited from the region’s trade. This “Carthaginian” peace led to the legendary (perhaps mythical) story recounted by Polybius, where Hamilcar made his son Hannibal swear an oath on the altar of Baal Hammon that he would forever be an enemy of Rome.

Conclusion
The First Punic War not only marked the first major confrontation between the two superpowers of Rome and Carthage, but it also opened a new chapter that would forever change the political and economic landscape of the Mediterranean. With Carthage’s defeat, Rome laid the foundation for its ambitions of regional domination, while Carthage faced an inevitable decline.
Through this article on Thefactsofwar, we hope that readers have gained a more comprehensive understanding of the First Punic War—its causes, events, and consequences. We aim to convey the deep historical lessons from this event and spark curiosity about the transformative moments in human history.
Translated by: Minh Tuan
Source: thecollector.com – The First Punic War: A Clash of Cultures